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Introduction
The Man in the White Sharkskin Suit is an autobiographical story of the
expulsion of Arab Jews from Egypt after the 1956 Suez War. After
the book was published the author, Lucette Lagnado, received a letter
from a retired Egyptian diplomat who wrote ‘almost no one wants to
admit the horrible… even criminal way Egyptian Jews have been
treated.” As Lagnado commented, ‘I realized that after forty years,
my family—and tens of thousands of others--had finally
obtained…what they had most wanted, other than the ability to
return: An apology—an acknowledgment of our pain.”2
According to a United Nations General Assembly Resolution,
“victims of gross violations of international human rights law and
serious violations of international humanitarian law” have the right to
a remedy. Remedies include inter alia “Public apology, including
acknowledgement of the facts and acceptance of responsibility;”
1

Peter Baehr, Mark Gibney, Nava Löwenheim, Joanna Quinn, and Doron
Shultziner offered valuable comments on an earlier draft of this manuscript, as did
Peter Malcontent and Marcus Duwall: I am grateful to all of them. I also thank
Kwan-Sen Wen for his research assistance, and the Centre for International
Governance Innovation for appointing Mr. Wen as my research assistant. I am
grateful to the Canada Research Chairs program for the funds and time to write
this chapter, and to Wilfrid Laurier University for appointing me to my Chair.
2 Lucette Lagnado, The Man in the White Sharkskin Suit: A Jewish Family’s Exodus from
Old Cairo to the New World ( New York, Harper Perennial, 2008), Post script 15.
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“Verification of the facts and full and public disclosure of the truth;”
and guarantees of non-repetition, all aspects of a complete and
satisfactory apology. Victims are defined as “persons who individually
or collectively suffered harm” as well as “the immediate family or
dependants of the direct victim.” Thus, evolving international law
requires apologies to victims and their direct family members for
gross violations of their human rights. This Resolution, however,
does not call for retrospective apologies for events that have no
surviving victims or family members or dependants.3 Nevertheless,
since the 1980s official apologies have proliferated.4
I define an official apology as an apology by a corporate
entity with standing to represent a group of some kind. The
corporate entity is often a state, but could also be a business or a
private group such as a religious community. The corporate entity
issues the apology in the name of the group it represents, such as the
citizenry of a country, the officers and shareholders of a corporation,
or the members of a religious community. The individual who
delivers the actual apology has standing to do so because she
officially represents the corporate entity, regardless of whether the
incident or words for which she is apologizing occurred during her
tenure in office. Many corporate entities such as states last over
centuries; just as a successor government of a state takes over the
monetary debts accrued by previous governments, so it takes over
the legal and moral debts of its predecessors.
Decisions to issue official apologies raise complex questions
about trans-generational justice, or justice from living people to past
General Assembly of the United Nations, ‘Basic Principles and Guidelines on the
Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International
Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law,’
GA Resolution 60/147, 16 December 2005. Section V, Article 8; Section VIII,
Article 22, e; Article 22, b: Article 23.
4 For explanations of most of the apologies mentioned in this chapter, as well as
links to the texts of the actual apologies and/or press articles about them, see
Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann, Editor, Political Apologies and Reparations Website,
Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, http://politicalapologies.wlu.ca.
3
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generations. Individual members of corporate entities often oppose
apologies issued in their name on the grounds that they are not
personally guilty of actions taken by either their actual biological, or
their corporate, ancestors. Many private citizens opposed an apology
for the slave trade by Britain on the grounds that neither they nor
their ancestors were involved in the trade, and they therefore did not
want the British government to apologize in their name. This
appeared to be, for them, a matter of human dignity or moral stature;
they did not want to be held culpable for an act for which they bore
no personal guilt.5 Although an official apology bore no material
costs, the moral cost to them was the undermining of their ancestors’
reputations.
In favour of official apologies for past wrongs, one can argue
that while guilt, or fault, is an attribute held by an individual only if
she has actually committed a harmful act, responsibility is another
matter. Membership in a corporate entity means the individual shares
in the entity’s responsibility to ameliorate the consequences of
injustices that it perpetrated. The corporate entity bears this moral
responsibility even if its actions or lack of action were legal at the
time they occurred.6 Moreover, the human dignity of those whom the
entity has wronged is at stake, and overrides any damages to the
human dignity of individual members of the corporate entity that
might be a consequence of the apology. If no apology for the harm is
offered, then the wronged are not recognized as morally equal human
beings, deserving of respect from those who wronged them. Even if
the actual victims are dead, their descendants may still suffer from the
grievous wrongs inflicted on their ancestors and still be in need of
“moral restitution.”7

Michael Cunningham, ‘“It Wasn’t Us and We Didn’t Benefit”: The Discourse of
Opposition to an Apology by Britain for its Role in the Slave Trade,’ The Political
Quarterly, vol. 79, no. 2, 2008: 252-59.
6 Janna Thompson, Taking Responsibility for the Past: Reparation and Historical Justice
(Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2002), xviii-xix.
7 Robert R. Weyeneth, ‘The Power of Apology and the Process of Historical
Reconciliation,’ The Public Historian, vol. 23, no.3, 2001: 31.
5
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Types and Functions of Official Apologies
Much of the literature on official apologies conflates different types
of apologies for different types of events and between different
actors, as if the content, enactment, and effects of the apologies do
not vary according to the situation. By contrast, I suggest that official
apologies can be divided into at least three categories: diplomatic
apologies, political apologies, and historical apologies.
Diplomatic apologies occur between states. One state has
offended another—sometimes unintentionally—and the offender
state wishes to repair diplomatic relations. An example is the apology
tendered by the United States to China for accidentally bombing the
Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999, when NATO attacked Serbia
to stop the ethnic cleansing of Albanians from the Serbian province
of Kosovo. The function of these apologies is straightforward, to
restore relations to the status quo ante. The two parties often negotiate
the content of the apology before it is offered, so that both sides can
save face within the public act of contrition and its acceptance.
Apologies by corporate entities for past actions are less
straightforward. Although frequently they are all referred to as
apologies for historical wrongs,8 it is useful to separate them into two
categories, political and historical apologies. Political apologies are for
acts that have continuing political relevance, where there are real
political risks such as vengeful attacks or social disruption if the
offending party does not apologize to the offended. These wrongs
may be for acts perpetrated within living memory—some victims or
their immediate heirs are still alive—or for acts perpetrated much
earlier that nevertheless still so affect the descendants of the
immediate victims as to have continuing political relevance. For
example, the government of Germany apologized in 2004 for the
genocide of the Herero people of South-West Africa (now Namibia)
by German colonists and the German army between 1904 and 1908.9
While there were probably no, or very few, living survivors of that
Michael R. Marrus, ‘Official Apologies and the Quest for Historical Justice,’
Journal of Human Rights, vol. 6, no. 1, 2007: 75-105.
9 Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann, Reparations to Africa ( Philadelphia, University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 100-02.
8
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genocide, resentment of Germany by citizens of Namibia could
disrupt German-Namibian relations.
Thus, one inter-state function of political apologies is to
restore relations that were intentionally ruptured during warfare,
conquest, or other large-scale events. Such apologies also
demonstrate respect for international laws, thus contributing to the
preservation of international order and stability.10 For example, Japan
has apologized frequently for acts perpetrated against other Asian
states such as Korea that it colonized and conquered before and
during WWII. Germany has issued many statements of regret and
apologies to Israel, the Jewish community, and European countries
that it conquered during WWII, starting with a statement of regret
issued by the first post-WWII Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, in
1951.11
Political apologies can be internal to a state as well as between
states. An intra-state function of political apologies is to restore or
rectify a wrongdoing entity’s sense of its own self. Both Canada and
the United States issued apologies to individuals of Japanese descent
who were interned and deprived of their property during WWII,
ostensibly because they might have been acting on behalf of Japan, a
member of the enemy Axis powers. Japanese-Americans and
Japanese-Canadians are very small percentages of their respective
countries’ populations and do not appear to have any electoral
influence, but in retrospect the internment grossly violated their
human rights. The American and Canadian apologies to these two
groups are part of a larger project to declare the respective countries
non-racist and multicultural. Similar concerns can motivate newly
democratizing states. In 1992, for example, the President of Hungary
apologized to foreign students and Roma for attacks on them by
right-wing and racist forces, and indifference to their plight by
Hungarian police. In this case, it has been suggested, the President

Nava Löwenheim, ‘A Haunted Past: Requesting forgiveness for wrongdoing in
International Relations,’ Review of International Studies, vol. 35, 2009: 554.
11 Löwenheim, 549-53.
10
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was trying to reinforce the new, post-Communist Hungary’s identity
as a liberal, nondiscriminatory society.12
Another intra-state function of political apologies is to restore
the dignity of the individuals or groups that were wronged,13 so that
they can be more fully (re)incorporated into the democratic body
politic as equal citizens.14 The apology is also educative, teaching
those who might not know about past wrongs—or realize the harm
the wrongs cause even to current generations—about what
happened. If the wider public supports the apology, then there is a
greater chance for “societal reconciliation.”15
Although there is some overlap, strictly historical apologies
can be separated from political ones. Historical apologies are for
events that occurred in the distant past and that are not part of the
actual lived experience of current members of states or communities.
They are apologies for acts that do not have any particular present
political relevance, even if they wronged the ancestors of a particular
group of people. Such apologies are directed to the descendants—
either individuals or corporate bodies—of those presumed to have
been harmed by the historic act, and can be either inter- or intrastate. Intra-state apologies are numerous, such as those offered by the
governments of settler states (Canada, the United States, Australia
and New Zealand) to indigenous peoples.
Apologies for historical events raise questions not pertinent
to diplomatic or political apologies. Returning to the debate about a
British apology for the slave trade mentioned above, for example,
even if the United Kingdom was responsible in part for the
transatlantic slave trade, commentators question for what, at this late
date, it ought to apologize. They also ask what “credit” the United
Elizabeth Kiss, ‘Saying We’re Sorry: Liberal Democracy and the Rhetoric of
Collective Identity,’ Constellations, vol.4, no. 3, 1998: 387-98.
13 Nick Smith, I was Wrong: the Meaning of Apologies ( New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2008), 10.
14 John Borneman, ‘Public Apologies as Performative Redress,’ SAIS Review, vol.
25, no. 2, 2005: 59-60.
15 Melissa Nobles, The Politics of Official Apologies (New York, Cambridge University
Press, 2008), 70.
12
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Kingdom receives for its attempt in the 19th century to abolish the
trade. Moreover, some argue that not only European slave buyers,
but also African slave sellers, were responsible for the trade,
absolving the United Kingdom of some of its responsibility. Finally,
it is not clear to whom—descendants of enslaved Africans, the
continent of Africa, or Britons offended by the very idea of a slave
trade—an apology might be owed. In the event, Prime Minister Tony
Blair in 2006 expressed general “sorrow” for the slave trade, rather
than offering an outright apology.
If the acts for which historical apologies are offered have no
contemporary political relevance, why should they be made? A
nation’s security is not threatened if they are not offered. Historical
apologies have a symbolic and integrative function, however;
members of groups that suffered historical wrongs are more likely to
feel a respected part of the relevant political entity if they receive an
apology, no matter how late. Apologies help groups that suffered
severe wrongs become members of the national community.16 Similar
reasons influence non-state entities’ decisions to apologize. The
Roman Catholic Church apologized to God for its treatment of
women and indigenous people in the hope that members of these
groups would feel more fully welcomed (back) into the Church. The
Church also apologized to God for its poor relations with Jews, both
to maintain good relations with the Jewish community and to reestablish the Church’s sense of itself as genuinely Christian, in the
modern sense of universal love.
Complete Apologies
Much philosophical and social scientific discussion of what
constitutes a complete, and presumably successful, apology exists.
Most scholars who discuss this question propose similar lists of
requirements, many deriving their list from inter-personal, rather than
official, apologies. For example, Tavuchis maintains that an apology
must “acknowledge the fact of wrongdoing, accept ultimate
responsibility, express sincere sorrow and regret, and promise not to
16

Nobles, 1-41.
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repeat the offense.”17 This is generally acknowledged to be a
minimum definition of a complete apology. An interpersonal apology
is an acknowledgement of the dignity of the individual who has been
wronged. It recognizes that person’s suffering; the apologizer
expresses remorse for having caused a fellow human being pain. This
results, it is hoped, in an equalization of the relationship between the
two parties to the apology and a restoration of the good relations that
are presumed to have existed before one party wronged the other; the
apology requires victims and perpetrators of a past wrong to morally
identify with one another.
Most scholars of official apologies agree on a core set of
definitional attributes similar to but more extensive than the
attributes of an interpersonal apology. These attributes include
establishment and acknowledgement of the facts of the case, so that
they are not in dispute and a common history accepted by both the
apologizer and the recipient of the apology can be written. In making
the apology, the apologizer must also identify each wrong committed,
so as not to obscure the enormity of the harm perpetrated on the
recipients. Both sides must agree that the apologizer represents the
entity responsible for the wrong committed, and the apologizer must
accept that responsibility, thus absolving the recipients of any residual
psychological feeling that perhaps they caused the harm by their own
actions. The apology must be sincere, and the apologizer must show
regret and remorse for harming the recipient, making clear that it
believes its actions were wrong. Such emotional characteristics are in
the eye of the recipient of the apology; if not correctly “performed,”
by the apologizer, the apology has little value to its recipient. The
apologizer must show both empathy and respect for the recipients, in
order to re-balance the relationship between the two of them and
undo any diminution of the recipients’ social worth implied by the
wrong the apologizer earlier committed. The apologizer also has to
promise not to repeat the action for which it apologizes. Finally, the
apologizer must have standing to make the apology: while in
Nicholas Tavuchis, Mea Culpa: A Sociology of Apology and Reconciliation (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1991), vii.
17
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interpersonal apologies the apologizer must be the individual who
actually committed the wrong, in official apologies she must be the
legitimate representative of the entity responsible for the
wrongdoing.
Expression of emotion is not as important in an official as a
personal apology. Recipients recognize that a spokesperson for a
corporate entity who is not herself guilty of the past wrong (for
example, because she was not yet born) cannot be expected to show
the same level of remorse as an individual apologizing for a wrong
for which she is directly responsible. On the other hand, an official
apology requires more actors than an interpersonal one; whereas the
latter is a private matter, the former is public. The publics of both the
apologizer (for example the citizenry of a state) and those receiving
the apology (for example the members of the group that suffered the
wrong) have to be aware of the apology. Often, moreover, both
parties negotiate the form and content of the apology ahead of time,
as well as who is to be the spokesperson for the apologizing entity.
The apology is often surrounded by ritual, sometimes also negotiated
in advance. The venue where the apology is to take place, its décor,
clothing to be worn, music to be performed, speeches to be made,
and persons to attend, are all negotiated.
These negotiated aspects of official apologies are important,
as apologies seen to be perfunctory can do more harm than good.
The government of Canada apologized twice to its indigenous
peoples. In 1998, Jane Stewart, then Minister of Indian and Northern
Affairs, delivered the apology. Although it was sincere, it was not
delivered by then Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, who did not even
attend the ceremony,18 it was not widely publicized, and it was not
surrounded by ritual. In 2008, Prime Minister Stephen Harper
apologized to Canada’s indigenous peoples again for the federal
government’s role in the Indian residential schools system, this time
in the House of Commons, in the presence of many invited guests
from the aboriginal communities.

18

Nobles, 74.
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There is some debate as to whether an apology can be
complete and ultimately successful if it does not include material
reparations. Minow argues that “Valuing the losses from torture and
murder strains the moral imagination;”19 nevertheless, monetary
reparations have a symbolic value. Money has a certain “social
gravity” that is a measure of the sincerity of an apology.20 Symbolic
reparations or token amounts of money, such as the Can$21,000
given to each living survivor of the Japanese-Canadian internment
camps, can reinforce the sincerity of an official apology. Africans
discussing the possibility of an apology from the “West” for the slave
trade almost uniformly said that without some material compensation
an apology would be useless.21 By contrast, surviving WWII British
prisoners of war and civilian internees disagree about whether the
Japanese government owed them financial compensation.22
Experimental psychological work on interpersonal apologies revealed
that for some individuals, “withholding financial compensation
undermines the effectiveness of an apology,” but in general,
withholding financial compensation would not mean that an apology
would be deemed inadequate.23
In the case of historical apologies, financial compensation is
often impractical as the offended group, such as women in the
Roman Catholic Church, is so large as to undermine any attempt to
financially compensate individuals. Moreover, some wronged people
reject financial compensation as “blood money,” as in the
acrimonious debate in Israel in the early 1950s about whether that
state should accept financial reparations from Germany.24 And some
Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and
Mass Violence (Boston, Beacon Press, 1998), 104.
20 Smith, 238.
21 Howard-Hassmann, 145-49.
22 Michael Cunningham, ‘Prisoners of the Japanese and the Politics of Apology: A
Battle over History and Memory,’ Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 39, no. 4, 2004:
561-74.
23 Craig W. Blatz, Karina Schumann, and Michael Ross, ‘Government Apologies
for Historical Injustices,’ Political Psychology, vol. 30, no.2, 2009: 233, 237.
24 Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, ‘Forgive and Not Forget: Reconciliation
Between Forgiveness and Resentment,’ in Elazar Barkan and Alexander Karn, eds.,
19
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individuals or groups who were wronged would consider payment of
financial reparations a further assault on their human dignity. Thus,
there are times when an apology not only does stand alone, but ought
to. Apologies in and of themselves do contain significant potential
for “moral repair.”25
Apologies as a Social Movement
Political apologies became common in the late twentieth century,
especially in Western society, as a response to wider social forces.
These wider social forces included changes in religious thinking and
values, especially among Christians who after 1945 debated
Christianity’s role in the Holocaust. Internal changes within the
Christian community also reflected a newer Western humanism,
which in turn both contributed to and reinforced the creation of the
post-WWII human rights regime, with its stress on the equal dignity
and worth of all human beings, starting with the 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. Starting in the 1960s, there were also
new social movements in Western states for the civil rights of
African-Americans, for women’s rights, and for gay and lesbian
rights, which resulted in legal and public policy reform. These social
movements relied in part on personal testimony of those who had
been harmed, as reflected, for example, in the women’s movement
slogan that ‘the personal is political.’ Both the experiences of those
who were oppressed and the desire of those who were members of
the oppressing groups to make amends contributed to a culture of
confessions and a social expectation that confession—or apology—
could constitute absolution for past sins. The idea that victims
deserved recognition and deserved to have their stories heard became
more prominent in Western discourse and ideologies,26 and

Taking Wrongs Seriously: Apologies and Reconciliation ( Stanford, CA, Stanford
University Press, 2006), 92.
25 Trudy Govier and Wilhelm Verwoerd, ‘Taking Wrongs Seriously: A Qualified
Defence of Public Apologies,’ Saskatchewan Law Review, vol. 65, 2002: 139.
26 Frank Furedi, Therapy Culture: Cultivating Vulnerability in an Uncertain Age, (London:
Routledge, 2004).
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eventually intersected with other ideals of reconciliation such as the
South African stress on ubuntu, or community.
As of the 1990s, these new social ideals began to influence
new mechanisms of post-conflict resolution such as truth
commissions, with their stress on agreed narratives, personal healing,
and intra- or inter-state reconciliation. Many scholars argued that
such reconciliation was a prerequisite to social trust, itself a
prerequisite to a functioning liberal democracy. Thus, a social
movement to encourage official apologies began among those
responsible for rebuilding torn societies ostensibly in transition to
democracy.
Within already established liberal democracies, official
apologies were used to try to build or re-establish trust between
authorities and previously marginalized or oppressed groups.
Sometimes, apologies were offered for particular incidents that
symbolized the systemic marginalization of large groups, as when
Canada’s Prime Minister Harper apologized in 2008 to the entire
Indo-Canadian community for a 1914 incident in which Canadian
authorities returned a boatload of predominantly Sikh would-be
immigrants to India, where the British killed 38 and imprisoned or
transported many more.27 When apologies are not offered, victims of
past wrongs may continue to mistrust current governments, even if
financial reparations are offered. Australian aboriginal people were
allocated funds in 1997 for health, counseling and family services in
recognition of their suffering under the ‘Stolen Children’ policy
which removed aboriginal children from their families, but then
Prime Minister Howard refused to apologize for the policy.28 The
apology offered by Howard’s successor, Kevin Rudd, as soon as he
took office in 2008, movingly acknowledged the responsibility of the
government for the harm done to the aboriginal community.
Whether apologies were offered, however, often had more to
do with who sought them than with the objective situations that
27Matt

James, ‘Scaling memory: Reparation displacement and the case of BC,’
Canadian Journal of Political Science, vol. 42, no. 2, 2009: 366.
28 T.L. Zutlevics, ‘Recognition, Responsibility and Apology,’ Public Affairs Quarterly,
vol. 16, no. 1, 2002.
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particular groups might have suffered in the past. Apologies are not a
free good; if groups do not seek them, they are unlikely to be offered,
at least by governments (religious communities do sometimes offer
apologies that have not been sought). A successful social movement
for an apology requires moral entrepreneurs to lead it, organizational
resources to garner followers who agree that there should be an
apology, contacts with the press and other organizations that will
support the demand, public support, and leverage over the
government of some kind. The event for which an apology is sought
should offend current standards of morality; for example, slavery,
genocide, mass torture, severe violations of equality rights, or
deprivation of property. The victims of the event should be an easily
identifiable, cohesive group, acknowledged by outsiders to constitute
a collective entity. A short ‘causal chain’ between the alleged
perpetrator and the crime will make it easier to establish the case for
an apology: for example, the causal chain between Nazism and the
extermination of the Jews is much shorter than that between the
slave trade and underdevelopment in Africa. If the event for which
an apology is sought was discrete and bounded in time, an apology is
easier to obtain that if the event was pervasive and continuous. If
there is an expectation that the apology will be followed by financial
reparations, then it is also easier to apologize if a small number of
people were affected by the transgression, as the costs of reparations
will be correspondingly lower.29
Apologies to both Japanese-Americans and JapaneseCanadians, for example, were for discrete acts that took place during
WWII, that lasted only a few years, and that affected relatively small
numbers of people, an even smaller number of whom were still alive
when the apologies and financial reparations were offered. Apologies
for actions and omissions that took place over many years, affecting
many millions of people, are harder to come by. Thus, there has been
no national US apology to African-Americans for their centuries of
enslavement and discrimination. By contrast, there have been
apologies for specific incidents affecting smaller numbers of African29

Howard-Hassmann, 47-50.
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Americans. In 1997 President Clinton apologized for the Tuskegee
‘medical experiments’ conducted in the mid-20th century, in which
African-American men with syphilis were denied treatment so that
the progress of the disease could be studied. Individual American
institutions, such as the University of Alabama, also apologized for
specific acts, such as allowing professors to own slaves and
occupying buildings built by slaves.30
Similarly, the Canadian government has never issued an
apology to African-Canadians (Canadians of African descent), some
of whose ancestors were enslaved in Canada until 1833, and who, as
a group, are consistently ranked among the poorest in Canada. In the
African-Canadian case, the victim group is not easily identifiable.
African-Canadians are split among those whose ancestors were
enslaved; those whose ancestors escaped to Canada from the US
after 1833 to live in freedom; and those whose ancestors—or who
themselves—moved to Canada more recently. It would be difficult to
unite this community in search of an apology and difficult to decide
for what exactly an apology should be sought. On the other hand, the
Mayor of the city of Halifax, Nova Scotia apologized in 2010 for the
destruction in the 1960s of an African-Canadian community known
as Africville, ostensibly to improve residents’ living standards by
moving them to housing with better access to services, but possibly
also to make way for a new transportation route. This confirms the
theory that it is easier to apologize for discrete events affecting
relatively few people at a particular time than to apologize for events
spanning several centuries and affecting many generations.
Apologies and Reconciliation
In the ideal model of interpersonal apologies, something like the
following occurs:

Alfred L. Brophy, ‘The University and the Slaves: Apology and Its Meaning,’ in
Mark Gibney, Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann, Jean-Marc Coicaud and Niklaus
Steiner, eds., The Age of Apology: Facing Up to the Past (Philadelphia, University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 109-19.
30
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Apology (acknowledgement of the facts, taking responsibility for the
harm done, expression of sorrow and remorse, promise of nonrepetition) → forgiveness→ restored good relations→ increased
interpersonal trust→ reconciliation.
All of these aspects of the process except forgiveness are also
necessary to official apologies.
Analysts of interpersonal apologies frequently address the
question of forgiveness and the conditions under which recipients are
willing or unwilling to forgive apologizers for their transgressions.
The definition of forgiveness varies: for some analysts, mere
acceptance of an apology implies forgiveness, while for others,
forgiveness is a deep psychological process in which the recipient of
the apology relinquishes his anger or desire for vengeance,
“surrendering the right to get even,”31 and is able to focus on other
matters, thus “moving on” (to resort to popular parlance).
Characteristics of interpersonal apologies may not have any
relevance for collective apologies, however. Deep psychological
forgiveness is not necessary in the chain of causality from official
apology to reconciliation; it is enough that the victim of past wrongs
formally accepts the apology and in so doing abandons his desire for
revenge. Some analysts of recent attempts at national reconciliation
have criticized pressure on individual victims to forgive after
apologies for political acts have been offered; for example, in the case
of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission.32 But it
is not clear that there is any necessity for forgiveness in official
situations, even if for personal reasons, a victim might be better off
letting go of resentment by forgiving the violation rather than
holding a grudge.
In an official apology, it might be enough to substitute a
restored sense of self-worth for forgiveness. A frequent assertion in
the psychological literature is that an interpersonal apology
31Michael

Henderson, Forgiveness: Breaking the Chain of Hate (Wilsonville, Oregon:
Book Partners, 1999), 2.
32 Annelies Verdoolaege, ‘Managing Reconciliation at the Human Rights Violations
Hearings of the South African TRC,’ Journal of Human Rights, 5, 1, 2006: 61-80.
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contributes to the moral recognition and acknowledgement of
victims’ sense of human worth and dignity. Recipients of apologies
will enjoy a restored sense of self when it is confirmed that they did
not bring their sufferings on themselves and are not responsible for
what happened to them.33 In political as in interpersonal relations,
apologies can result in restoration of the victim group’s sense of selfworth. When the perpetrator has publicly acknowledged harm and
expressed remorse, victims can be assured that the crime is not likely
to be repeated. This may give the former victims more selfconfidence about participating in the wider society.
The principal function of official apologies is the restoration
of civil relationships between the apologizer and recipients, whether
or not the recipients personally forgive the apologizer. In the case of
diplomatic apologies, civil relations can be assumed to be restored
once both sides have agreed on the wording and ritual of the apology
and it has been delivered and accepted. In the case of political
apologies, restoration or creation of good relations can help to
prevent future outbreaks of violence or vengeance; thus, despite
bitter memories of WWII and occasional acts of Chinese nationalist
hostility to Japan (perhaps orchestrated by the government), relations
between Japan and the Asian states it had colonized have been
peaceful since 1945. In the case of historical apologies, restoration of
good relations might prevent an unanticipated outbreak of vengeful
violence, for example, if a group becomes preoccupied with
memories of its past victimization to the point that it resorts to
violence to avenge past wrongs.
The formal offer and acceptance of apologies, followed by
restored civil relations, can contribute to increased social trust
between previously antagonistic or estranged groups. Lazare argues
that “the apology process holds out…the prospect of restored
respect, of healed relationships, of civility, and of a clearer sense of
morality among individuals and nations who inhabit an evershrinking world.”34 In international relations, trust is more likely
33
34
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among previously warring groups if they apologize to each other for
harms they have committed. Apologies within nations might result in
development of a thin type of “civic trust” among citizens;35 even if
they do not yet consider themselves to be part of the same national
community, groups of citizens can assume that actual hostilities have
ended. A thin sort of cosmopolitan trust can also emerge from
international apologies, as in the case of relations between Germany
and Israel, which gradually were based on trust from the 1950s on. In
this sense, apologies are confidence-building measures, increasing the
likelihood that former enemies can interact civilly. Once more
confidence is built between formerly antagonistic parties, trust can
thicken to the point that they are actually reconciled to living with
each other.
In official situations, reconciliation does not require victims
to forgive, nor do victims need to reconcile in any interpersonal sense
with their former oppressors; it is enough that previously antagonistic
groups can function together in the public sphere without further
conflict or mistrust. The apologizer and recipients of an apology
should ideally be able to interact together in the marketplace, in
public institutions such as schools, and in politics, treating each other
respectfully as equals. At the same time, the victims of the acts for
which the apologies were offered can continue to live their private
lives separately from the perpetrators of the crimes or the group to
which the perpetrator belongs. It is possible to combine public, civic
reconciliation with private, personal mistrust; reconciliation might
simply mean “a mutual agreement to co-exist.”36
Thus, the following model describes an ideal process of
official apology, as opposed to an interpersonal one:
Apology → victims’ restored sense of self-worth→ restored good
relations→ increased social trust→ reconciliation.
Pablo de Greiff, ‘The Role of Apologies in National Reconciliation Processes:
On Making Trustworthy Institutions Trusted,’ in Gibney et al., 126.
36 Joanna R. Quinn, ‘Introduction’ to Joanna R. Quinn, ed. Reconciliation(s):
Transitional Justice in Postconflict Societies ( Montreal and Kingston, McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 2009), 12.
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This model removes psychological and religious variables from
analysis of political reconciliation, acknowledging that official
apologies are political tools, not interpersonal acts.
A Skeptical View of Official Apologies
If official apologies have positive reconciliatory effects, they may be a
powerful political tool. Nevertheless, we have no systematic
evidence that they do have such effects. What we assume to be a
consequence of an apology may be the consequence of other factors
linked to it.
It may be that the social and political conditions that precede
the apology are more influential than the apology itself. When leaders
of liberal democracies offer historical apologies, for example, they are
often apologizing to ethnic or religious groups who no longer suffer
discrimination, as is the case for Japanese-Canadians and JapaneseAmericans. By contrast, when leaders of liberal democracies
apologize to social groups such as aboriginal people who still suffer
discrimination and other social impediments, the apology itself does
little but buttress a fragile trust that may be broken if concrete
measures to ameliorate their suffering do not follow. Similarly,
although the Catholic Church has offered numerous apologies for its
sins of the distant past, its apologies for sins of the more recent past,
especially physical and sexual abuse of children in its care, have rung
hollow, as more and more cases of abuse are revealed and there is
more and more evidence that the Church tried to conceal evidence
and protect its personnel from prosecution. Many Irish Catholics
reacted with disappointment to the Pope’s apology in March 2010 for
child abuse committed by members of the Roman Catholic clergy.37
Liberal democratic governments often apologize for acts that
are already completely beyond the pale in present-day politics; thus,
the promise of non-repetition rings hollow as non-repetition is
already guaranteed. It is easy to apologize for past racial
Pamela Newenham, ‘Mixed reaction to pope’s letter,’ irishtimes.com, March 20,
2010.
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discrimination, mass internments of members of particular ethnonational groups, or refusal to permit people from particular parts of
the world to immigrate, given that all such policies were outlawed
several decades ago in liberal democracies. Liberal democratic
governments do not apologize for continued systematic violations of
human rights, such as the below-subsistence welfare payments that
many governments offer the poor.
Sometimes, apologies appear to be offered more for selfserving reasons than as a result of genuine contrition. For example,
the motivation behind the apology by Stephen Harper, a
Conservative Prime Minister of Canada, to the Indo-Canadian
community for the government’s exclusion of a boatload of Indian
immigrants almost a hundred years ago might have been to garner
votes from Indo-Canadians, an ethnic constituency that had
traditionally voted for the Liberal Party. When apologies are offered
by states to groups who are weak political actors, the reason may be
to bolster the apologizer’s own self-image as a legitimate, democratic
entity. On February 23, 2010 Prime Minister Gordon Brown of the
United Kingdom apologized to British ‘home children,’ adults who
were deported as children from poverty-stricken families in the UK
to live and work in Canada and Australia, where they were often
severely exploited and sexually assaulted. Brown knew that such a
crime would never be repeated, and that the surviving home children
were not a politically powerful group.
Often the most egregious violators of human rights and
humanitarian law are those least likely to apologize. Imperialist
countries do not apologize for histories and continued practices of
conquest; President Clinton’s apology to Guatemalans in 1999 for
having supported their brutal military rulers was notable for its
rarity.38 ‘Apologies’ by the US government for the tortures and other
excesses at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq consistently misled the public

Mark Gibney and Erik Roxstrom, ‘The Status of State Apologies,’ Human Rights
Quarterly, vol. 23, no. 4, 2001: 926-37.
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about what actually happened and blamed subordinates rather than
those who ordered the torture.39
Finally, those individuals who actually commit evil acts
frequently do not experience the remorse or shame that it is
comforting to assume everyone must feel for violating the common
moral code. When asked at his trial in Israel in 1961 whether he felt
any remorse for his part in exterminating Europe’s Jewish
population, Adolf Eichmann replied in the negative, stating
“Remorse is for children.”40 Not everyone feels remorse: some
people enjoy seeing others suffer. Political ideologies, religious or
cultural beliefs, and indoctrination can also so affect entire
populations that they feel little or no remorse for their cruel actions,
as Goldhagen argues was the case for ordinary Germans who helped
to enact Nazi exterminatory policies.41 Perpetrators do not necessarily
have any desire to apologize, especially if apologizing is “potentially
humiliating”.42 Often the party that wants the wronged to forgive and
forget is the party that committed the injustice in the first place.43
There may also be cultural barriers to apologizing in societies where
saving face is a more important value than recreating community
between perpetrators and victims, or where intergenerational
vendettas between feuding parties are considered to be socially
honourable. In such cases, neither side may wish to release itself from
the “grip of history.”44

Mark Gibney and Niklaus Steiner, ‘Apology and the American “War on Terror”’,
in Gibney et al., 287-97.
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41 Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the
Holocaust (New York, Vintage Books, 1997).
42 Tavuchis, 9.
43 Theodor W. Adorno, ‘What Does Coming to Terms with the Past Mean?,’ in
Geoffrey Hartman, ed., Bitburg in Moral and Political Perspective (Bloomington,
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On the other side of the coin, ideologies and indoctrination
can also create a “politics of aggrieved memories” on the part of
victim groups.45 Such victims may not wish to acknowledge the
possibility of a common moral universe with the perpetrators of the
crimes against them, even if the perpetrators offer to apologize. In
some cases, the crime may simply be too horrendous for victims to
have any interest in reconciliation, even if they do not intentionally
wish to hold on to their grievances. Those who lost close family
members in the Holocaust, for example, might consider that the
more appropriate action is to refuse forgiveness and reconciliation,
and hope that the formal institutions of justice will punish the
perpetrators. Similarly, some survivors of people murdered during
the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa did not want to reconcile
or forgive; they wanted the perpetrators tried and punished.
In cases where neither party to a political conflict is
completely innocent, as each has perpetrated crimes against the other,
a one-sided apology might simply aggravate the grievances of the
other side. The people of the Republika Srpska, the Serbian part of
Bosnia, apparently feel little remorse for the brutalities of the 1990s
wars in ex-Yugoslavia, instead considering themselves the aggrieved
party.46 Psychological studies of interpersonal apologies suggest that
defensive individuals or those with low self-esteem will react to an
apology that acknowledges the facts of harm as a confirmation of
their feelings of having been wronged, increasing their desire for
revenge:47 so might some Serbians react to an apology from Croatians
or Muslims. Likewise, if the Serbian government were to offer an
apology and ask for forgiveness, there could be an internal backlash if
some Serbian citizens thought that the request for forgiveness

Tony Judt, ‘From the House of the Dead: On Modern European Memory,’ New
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46 Patricia Marchak, No Easy Fix: Global Responses to Internal Wars and Crimes against
Humanity (Montreal and Kingston, McGill-Queen’s University Press), 2008, 227-48.
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presented their “collective identity in a negative light.”48 Psychological
studies also show that interdependent individuals—those more
connected to others—are more likely to forgive transgressions than
those who are independent and less connected to others. 49 If there
are national cultures, either based on collective norms and
behavioural patterns or created by political propaganda, then cultures
that consider themselves superior to others might be less likely both
to apologize and to accept apologies than those that are more
connected to outsiders.
In any event, we do not know whether inter-group apologies
among the various actors in the Yugoslavia wars would have any
concrete effect. Considering German apologies to Jews, we do know
that Jews do not terrorize Germans and we might plausibly conclude
that they do not do so because the Germans acknowledged their guilt
and took responsibility to repair relations. But Germany also paid
substantial financial reparations both to individual Jewish victims of
the Holocaust and to Israel; these concrete reparations may mean
more than the apologies, which—as distinct from acknowledgement
of harm—were not actually made until 1970, when the then
Chancellor of Germany, Willy Brandt, famously fell to his knees in
front of a memorial to the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising of 1943. It may
also be that Jews do not terrorize Germans because they now live in
liberal democratic states such as Canada, the United States and Israel
where they are not threatened, or because they are more preoccupied
by other matters such as the continued Israeli conflict with
Palestinians. Moreover, unlike many current cases in which it is
hoped that political apologies will contribute to conflict resolution,
Jews and Germans do not compete for territory, resources, or power.
It is interesting to speculate whether a mutual apology between
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Israelis and Palestinians would have any reconciliatory effect, without
resolution of territorial disputes and the end of Israeli occupation.
Not only do apologies not necessarily result in reconciliation,
but reconciliation might not necessarily require apology. Germany
did not apologize for its conquest of France during WWII, yet France
and Germany reconciled quickly in the 1950s, as it was in France’s
interest to regard its former enemy as its new friend in the evolving
Cold War world.50 On the other hand, while apology is not necessary
for reconciliation, perpetrators of crimes must not deny what
happened. Denial can result in anger and calls for rupture of political
ties, as occurs when Japanese political conservatives decry apologies
from Japan to South Korea for colonialism and conquest. Denial also
increases the former victim’s perception that the former perpetrator
of a crime is still a threat, a serious matter in international relations.51
Thus, it appears that combined with other methods of
conflict resolution, political and historical apologies may help to
ameliorate conflict, but we do not yet have any testable evidence that
they do,52 whether or not they are supplemented by other policies
such as financial reparations. We do seem to have evidence that
diplomatic apologies alleviate the potential for conflict, but that may
be because they are a common method of statecraft, rather than a
new method to remedy or forestall inter-state conflict. The efficacy
of apologies should not be discounted; for example, when a
government expresses sincere remorse to a collectivity that previously
felt excluded from national society. But we should be careful not to
assume that an official apology can be as efficacious as interpersonal
apologies seem to be. To impute psychological theories about
individuals to entire nations is to commit the fallacy of composition;
imputation of charitable emotions of forgiveness and reconciliation is
no more valid that imputation of desires for vengeance. The author
of The Man in the White Sharkskin Suit may be willing to forgive the
Egyptians who expelled her and her family, after one Egyptian
Lind, 101-58.
Lind, 26-100.
52 Marrus, 90.
50
51

Transitional Justice Review, Vol.1, Iss.1, 2012, 31-53

Rhoda Howard-Hassmann 54

diplomat apologized, but this does not mean that hundreds of
thousands of other Jews will forgive Arab states for their expulsions.
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